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Abstrak
Amerika Tengah memiliki pengalaman terbanyak dalam upaya integrasi regional selain dari Eropa
dan integrasi regional yang sedang meningkat dengan pembentukan Sistem Integrasi Amerika Tengah
(Central American Integration System/SICA). Namun, dengan pengalaman Kosta Rika meninggalkan
SICA selama krisis migrasi Kuba pada 2015, organisasi tersebut berusaha untuk memajukan
integrasi. Tulisan ini berfokus pada faktor-faktor yang berkontribusi terhadap keluarnya Kosta Rika
dengan melihat: (1) tingkat kelembagaan SICA; (2) kebijakan Kosta Rika yang menghambat integrasi
Amerika Tengah; dan (3) alasan utama Kosta Rika terhadap bentuk tindakan non-integrasi. Artikel
ini berpendapat bahwa penyebabnya dapat ditemukan pada tingkat institusional dan nasional. Artikel
ini pun menunjukkan bahwa SICA gagal memperdalam integrasinya karena ambisi supranasional
yang ada dalam kerangka institusionalnya. Selain itu, melalui metode penelitian kualitatif, telah
ditemukan bahwa kebijakan luar negeri Kosta Rika dikarakteristikkan dengan penolakan terhadap
badan organisasi SICA. Artikel ini diakhiri dengan mengajukan empat alasan utama untuk
menjelaskan tindakan non-integrasi Kosta Rika yang dapat dimasukkan ke dalam (1) aspek historis,
(2) tidak ada manfaat perdagangan dari keanggotaannya, (3) masalah imigrasi, dan (4) legitimasi
masalah SICA.

Kata kunci:
Regionalisme, Sistem Integrasi Amerika Tengah, Kosta Rika, Krisis Migran

Abstract
Central America has the longest experience with regional integration efforts apart from Europe and
regional integration was on its rise with the establishment of the Central American Integration System
(SICA). However, the organisation has been struggling to move the integration process further;
experiencing a climax of fragmentation when Costa Rica left SICA during the Cuban migration crisis
in 2015. This article focuses on the factors which contributed to the withdrawal of Costa Rica by
looking at: (1) the institutional level of SICA; (2) Costa Rica’s policies that have hindered Central
American integration; and (3) Costa Rica’s main reasons for its non-integrationist actions. This
article argues that the cause can be found at both the institutional level and the national level. It
further shows that SICA failed at deepening its integration due to its supranational ambitions installed
in its institutional framework. Moreover, through qualitative research methods, it has been found that
Costa Rica’s foreign policy is characterised by defying SICA’s organisational bodies. This article
concludes by proposing four major reasons to explain Costa Rica’s non-integrationist actions which
can be subsumed under (1) historical aspects, (2) no trade benefits from its membership, (3)
immigration issues and lastly, (4) the legitimacy problem of SICA.

Keywords:
Regionalism, Central American Integration System, Costa Rica, Migrant Crisis
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INTRODUCTION
In the last two decades, we have witnessed an expansion of regional integration initiatives
around the world. Behr and Jokela identified three main reasons for states to begin
regional integration: an economic benefit, a political reason, or the fostering of a regional
identity (Behr & Jokela, 2011, p. 11). Hence, regional organisations can have various
functions and are created to fulfil different purposes. As the current Brexit debate
demonstrates, regionalism can always go both ways, either deepening integration or
declining. Accordingly, all these three functions have two extreme operational poles: the
economic function ranges from economic protectionism to economic union, the political
function ranges from political conflict to pooled sovereignty, and finally the identity
function ranges from clash of civilisations to regional identity (Behr & Jokela, 2011, p. 11).
Many regionalism studies have focused on the extraordinary integration process of the
European Union, which was primarily established as a platform for peaceful dispute
settlement and to prevent further wars but evolved into a deep cooperation1. Further
studies deal with the tackling of the migrant wave that also reached the European Union
in 2015 and its political and social approach towards migration (Fulvio, 2018). The
migrant crises in the European Union challenged the relations between the member states
within its own framework, although not dismantling it but rather driving integration
further (Charpentier, 2016, p. 34).
Central America has the longest experience with regional integration efforts apart
from Europe (Kühnhardt, 2010, p. 81). Despite its first regionalism efforts reaching back
to the 19th century, the Central American integration has not been very deep. The Central
American Common Market (MERCOMUN) failed due to the economic crisis and the
civil wars that shattered the region in the 1970s and 1980s. Its successor is the still
nowadays acting institutional framework The Central American Integration System,
which was created in 1993 by Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua
and Panama. Belize joined shortly after and in 2013, the Dominican Republic entered as
a full member as well. However, little research has been done on the recent integration
movements in Central America because it has long suffered from an institutional paralysis
(European Commission, 2003, p. 75). This was especially brought into public focus by
the Cuban migrant crisis in 2015. Over eight thousand migrants, who had been on their
way to the United States, were stranded at the border between Costa Rica and Nicaragua.
A border conflict evolved since Nicaragua refused to let the refugees cross its
national border. This led to an undersupply of provisions on Costa Rica’s side of the
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border. The problem was immediately referred to The Central American Integration
System (Spanish: Sistema de la Integración Centroamericana, short SICA), the
concerned regional organisation, to find a joint solution. Unfortunately, no solution was
found within SICA’s bodies, although both countries are founding member states of
SICA. The conflict resulted in the political withdrawal of Costa Rica from the
organisation. That development shows that SICA did not serve as a problem-solving tool
and that regional institutions are to be carefully established and maintained to function as
such. The main research question addressed in this paper is: Why did Costa Rica leave
the SICA? The paper will examine what might have led up to the escalation of the conflict
between Nicaragua and Costa Rica and why SICA has struggled to achieve a deeper
integration.
This paper focuses on the Central American integration process between the years
of 2012 to 2016. The organisation of the article is as follows. In the analytical framework,
the author briefly outlays the development of the Cuban migrant crisis, which is followed
by a description of SICA’s institutional framework embedded into a legalisation approach
and regional theories. The research method follows a qualitative research design. The
discussion will look at Costa Rica’s behaviour and the factors that may have contributed
to the withdrawal of Costa Rica. The section will focus on an analysis of SICA’s
institutional framework and its weak points. The paper ends with concluding remarks and
the outlook on further research in the last section. The research is expected to contribute
to International Relations studies relating to the theory and analysis of regional
institutions and foreign policy, especially those interested in Central American politics
and regionalism.

ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
2015 marked the year of a global mass migration crisis all around the world. Migration
became a major challenge for international cooperation schemes (Amalia, 2018, p. 39).
There are various articles investigating how regional organisations tackle the issue. An
article from Loïc Charpentier about the European Union and their migration crisis
management suggested that such a crisis can deepen relations between the European
countries more effectively. Further institutionalisation of different policies emerged in the
European Union as reaction to the crisis (Charpentier, 2016, p. 45). However, the majority
of literature on refugee issues focuses on the destination countries perspective, which is
heavily discussed by scholars, both in International Relations and migration studies. The
127
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perspectives from sending and transit countries, in which displaced people get stuck has
been neglected (Castles, 2010, p. 1565). SICA and the Central American countries as
transit countries entered a very difficult period in 2015 due to the Cuban migrant crisis.
The crisis was brought into motion by the beginning political convergence of Cuba and
the United States (US). Former US President Barack Obama and the Cuban Head of State
Raùl Castro began to improve diplomatic relations between the two countries at the end
of 2014. This historical turn lead to a huge Cuban migrant wave trying to enter the US
before the preferential treatment for Cubans to apply for political asylum would be
terminated and the benefit from the migratory advantages granted by the Cuban
Adjustment Act would be revoked. Most of the migrants preferred to take the land route
through Central America. This is due to the “wet foot - dry foot” policy, which states that
Cuban refugees can only apply for asylum when they have set foot on US soil (Spiegel
Online, 2016). Therefore, travelling by boat to Florida held a much higher risk of getting
caught by the US Coast Guard Police and consequently having to return to Cuba.
After thousands of migrants have crossed Panama and Costa Rica in 2015, the
asylum seekers had reached the Costa Rican border where their journey ended abruptly.
The border to Nicaragua was closed. Thousands of Cubans got stuck and waited to pass
the border. The international traffic at Peñas Blancas was blocked, also affecting Central
American trade. Nicaragua justified its actions by stating that Costa Rica had caused a
humanitarian crisis by handing out thousands of transit visas. Nicaragua accused its
southern neighbor of violating its sovereignty by allowing the Cuban migrants to enter
Nicaraguan territory (Spiegel online, 2015). Costa Rica hoped that SICA would allow for
communication and may be a good platform to find a solution to the problem. However,
the three Central American countries, Guatemala, Nicaragua and Belize, were unwilling
to find a joint solution for the migrant crisis in Costa Rica on the summit. Costa Rican
President, Luis Guillermo, did not understand why these three countries agreed on not
supporting Costa Rica in this crisis. Consequently, Costa Rica decided to leave SICA,
therefore retiring politically from it. In the meantime, Costa Rica stopped granting
temporary visas to arriving migrants from Cuba (Barton, 2016). Since discussions did not
bear fruits, Costa Rica made arrangements with El Salvador and Mexico. The migrants
would be put on a plane to get to El Salvador and then put on buses, which would take
them to Mexico. The airlift solution was to be an absolute exception, SICA told reporters.
Only eight thousand Cubans who had received a temporary visa could use this agreement.
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The other migrants who were still on their way to Costa Rica would be deported to Havana
(Henkel, 2015).

Approach to Legalisation
In order to fully understand why SICA could not serve as a conflict solving regional
organisation it is worth to take a closer look at its legalised institutional framework.
According to Goldstein et al. (2000) legalised institutions can be explained in terms of
their functional value, the preferences and incentives of domestic political actors, and the
embodiment of particular international norms. This paper focuses on SICA’s functional
value and the preference of Costa Rica’s political actors. The integrational purpose of
SICA is defined by its member states with the following four goals:

The Central American Integration System (SICA) is to realise the
integration of Central America in order for the Isthmus to become a Region
of Peace, Freedom, Democracy and Development (General Secretariat of
the Central American Integration System, n.d.).

The legal framework is built upon the Tegucigalpa Protocol, which amended the
Charter of the Organisation of Central American States (ODECA) of 1962. The goals of
Peace, Freedom, Democracy and Development, which are also written in Spanish on their
logo, are the foundation of SICA. The goals of freedom and peace expect a management
of the migration crisis without causing a border dispute over migrants that are on their
way through SICA member states to reach the United States of America. The Tegucigalpa
Protocol states in article 4 (g) that its members shall proceed in accordance with the
principle that “Legal certainty with respect to relations between the Member States and
the peaceful settlement of their disputes”, thus making SICA an explicit platform for
dispute settlement. The Protocol also requires the Meeting of Presidents to deal with
regional questions on which it is required to take decisions, with regard to democracy,
development, freedom, peace and security. The Meeting of Presidents shall be required
in particular to: (a) Define and direct Central American policy by establishing guidelines
for the integration of the region, as well as the provisions necessary to ensure the
coordination and harmonisation of the activities of the bodies and institutions of the
region, and the verification, monitoring and follow-up of its mandates and decisions
(General Secretariat of the Central American Integration System, 1991, p. 5).
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Regionalism
Finding a definition for regionalism has been attempted by many scholars.2 Joseph Nye
defined a region as “a limited number of states linked by a geographical relationship and
by a degree of mutual interdependence” and regionalism as a result from “the formation
of interstate associations or groupings on the basis of regions” (Nye, 1968, p. 7). Since
the emerging world order is increasingly multipolar, regional cooperation and integration
are likely to continue to play a major role, although not having received a lot of scholarly
attention until recently (Behr & Jokela, 2011, p. 43). This neglect is undeserving as
regional cooperation continues to be high on the agenda of states and other actors (Behr
& Jokela, 2011, p. 43).
Previous studies of regional cooperation have focused on the economic integration
and economic benefits as drivers for integration. As stated by Kusumaningrum in his
article on the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), a
liberalisation of trade and thus further integration should lead to an increase of “exportoriented industrialisation capacity”. In addition, foreign interest in the region coming
mainly from China and the EU are found to be drivers of regionalism (Behr & Jokela,
2011, p. 43). Naturally, investors want to keep their risk low and they would increasingly
invest in regions which have managed to stabilise their economy. Consequently, a stable
economy serves as a pull-factor for foreign investments (Tussie, 2014). However, “the
Latin American region is economically quite fragile” but shares a common interest in
improving its economic stance in developing regional organisations (Kusumaningrum,
2019, p. 132). As has been mentioned in the introduction, regional organisation can serve
three functions: economic interaction, political interaction and regional identity.

RESEARCH METHOD
Having established the background mechanism of SICA and the problems arising with
the Cuban migrant crisis, this paper uses a descriptive qualitative research that focuses on
the study of Central American Regionalism. Two units of research will be undertaken.
Firstly, the research is guided by a qualitative approach to analyse the legalised
institutional level of SICA drawing on the Tegucigalpa Protocol as the major data source.
The study will systematically examine SICA’s main bodies and their decision-making
procedures since “[t]he institutional design and decision-making procedures of regional
integration processes […] are further key features of regionalism” (Behr & Jokela, 2011,
p. 14). The second part of the analysis is a case study of Costa Rican policy using the
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approach proposed by Behr and Jokela who identified three main reasons for states to
deepen regional integration: an economic benefit, a political reason, or the fostering of a
regional identity (Behr & Jokela, 2011, p. 11). It will be examined how SICA’s
institutional problems and Costa Rica’s attitude toward regional integration shaped their
behaviour towards SICA. Primary data are obtained from content analysis of publications
on SICA’s official website and research dissemination from any journals or newspapers
that refer to Costa Rican policy or the framework of Central American cooperation. This
study uses data collection techniques by narrowing the time space between 2012-2016.

DISCUSSION
SICA’s Institutional Problems
The SICA consists out of 42 different entities that are based on the following main bodies:
(1) The Meeting of Central American Presidents (MCAP), consist of The Council of
Ministers (COM), General Secretariat of Central American Integration (SGSICA), and
Executive Committee (CE-SICA); (2) Central American Court of Justice (CCJ); (3)
Consultative Committee of the Central American (CCSICA); and (4) Central American
Parliament (Parlacen).
The General Secretariat of the SICA is located in the Republic of El Salvador. The
Meeting of Presidents is the supreme organ of the SICA and is held every six months by
all Presidents and Head of States of the Member States. This meeting can also take place
extraordinarily if wanted by the member states. The Presidency of the Meeting rotates
every six months. The Council of Ministers is part of this organisational structure and is
the primary organ. SICA is only a de facto intergovernmental institution, despite having
some supranational elements embedded in its framework. Looking at the several bodies
of SICA, it will become clear what institutional problems it faces, and consequently which
bodies pose as obstacles hindering the regional integration. Firstly, the Meeting of the
Presidents and the Council of Ministers will be analysed in the light of their decisionmaking procedure. Secondly, this paper will speak about the problematic stand of the
Parlacen and lastly, about the environment of the Central American Court of Justice, in
which it tries to foster its supranational rulemaking.
These first two SICA main bodies are completely intergovernmental by design of
the Tegucigalpa Protocol. The decisions made by the Meetings of Presidents (MCAP)
must be adopted by consensus (General Secretariat of the Central American Integration
System, 1991, p. 5). That makes it difficult to come to a decision if the states are reluctant
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to work together and only meet every six months under a different leadership. Hence, a
good will towards the integration process is essential for the functioning of this caucus.
However, this decision-making procedure is especially problematic because Nicaragua
and Costa Rica have had a tense relationship for a long time, which will be mentioned in
detail later. Likewise, the Council of Ministers (COM) is also ruled by consensus.
In addition to that, all ministers must be present in the meetings of the COM to be
able to decide on a matter. This means, that if there is one minister or vice minister
missing, the procedure of the COM will be blocked. Consequently, a single member state
could shut down the apparatus by not sending its minister to the COM. This is exactly
what happened when Costa Rica politically withdrew from the SICA. Furthermore, each
member state has a single vote, providing state egalitarianism in both the COM and the
MCAP. Since the integration is not very deep, the national states do not want to give up
any part of their sovereignty. The Tegucigalpa Protocol states that the various ordinary,
sectoral or intersectoral meetings of the COM are to be convened as often as “necessary
or at the request” of one of the members or of the MCAP (General Secretariat of the
Central American Integration System, 1991, p. 7).
Despite being the primary organ of the SICA, the Protocol only establishes its
formation through a vague formulation. Nonetheless, the COM is required to provide the
“necessary follow-up to ensure the effective implementation of the decisions” adopted by
the MCAP in the sector in which it is competent, and “to prepare the topics for possible
discussion” by the Meeting (General Secretariat of the Central American Integration
System, 1991, p. 7). This means that the COM is additionally responsible for the
implementation of the MCAP decisions. The SICA does not have a permanent body for
agenda-setting or decision-making that ensures that the communication between the states
is working. The institutional setup is loosely anchored. The following paragraph of the
Tegucigalpa Protocol is the only instruction given for the implementation of the MCAP
decisions.

This Protocol and instruments additional thereto and emanating therefrom
shall take precedence over any bilateral or multilateral agreement or
protocol between Member States on matters relating to Central American
integration. However, the provisions of such agreements or treaties shall
remain in force between such States so long as they do not contravene this
Protocol or hinder the pursuit of its purposes and aims. Any dispute
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concerning the implementation or interpretation of the provisions of this
Protocol and other instruments referred to in the preceding paragraph shall
be submitted to the Central American Court of Justice (General Secretariat
of the Central American Integration System, 1991, p. 11).
This paragraph pinpoints one of the SICA’s main problems: The Tegucigalpa
Protocol does give SICA agreements precedence, but it allows bilateral and multilateral
agreements with third countries. Furthermore, when entering an agreement with a third
state, the SICA member state only needs to inform SICA, but does not need permission
or approval for the deal. That gives SICA states a lot of freedom to make, for example,
trade agreements with third states. Another crucial point is that the Protocol lays down
that “Any dispute […] shall be submitted to the Central American Court of Justice.”,
which is problematic as the Central American Court of Justice is unrecognised by many
SICA members. To conclude: These two intergovernmental bodies have the power to
execute a declaration, but the apparatus is not fit to see the declarations through.
Consequently, many declarations are not enforced because of their non-binding character.
We will look at the two supranational bodies in the next step.
The Parlacen acts as the parliament of SICA and is directly elected by the people
of the participating countries. It is one of the supranational elements established by the
Tegucigalpa Protocol. Despite its democratic structure, the Parlacen has not much
legitimacy. Especially the low turnout in the elections shows how much the citizens lack
knowledge and involvement of the Parlacen (Giupponi, 2017, pp. 245–247). Although it
being the only body that makes it possible to take the public opinion into consideration,
the Parlacen can only give advice to the MCAP and the COM. Furthermore, not all SICA
member states participate in the Parlacen, which composes a huge problem and practically
renders the Parlacen unnecessary. Not only the Parlacen has difficulties to establish itself
as a functioning supranational body, but also the Central American Court of Justice (CCJ)
is struggling to be forceful enough. The CCJ has not achieved to have weight in the
SICA’s institutional conduct for over 20 years. Guatemala integrated into the CCJ in
2008, but Costa Rica, Panama and Dominican Republic have not ratified the CCJ in their
national institution to this day. Thus, the major obstacle for the CCJ is to overcome the
reoccurring attacks of its own SICA member states. Especially Panama and Costa Rica
did not show affirmative behaviour towards the CCJ. But even the other countries, who
ratified the CCJ, wanted to limit the interference of the international body as well.
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Integration seemed to go backwards. For example, the CCJ rulings were ignored. For
instance, in 2012, Guatemala declared that the CCJ was incompetent to know internal
issues and to rule over the member states. Furthermore, Guillermo Porras criticised the
CCJ in 2012 for never having completed its high court since it only had representatives
from El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua (Redacción Perro Bravo, 2012), which is still
true to this day. Summing up, not all the member states participate and therefore question
the authority of the CCJ, therewith undermining its power.
In conclusion it can be said that the greatest challenge for SICA is to overcome its
weakness of the rule of law and to get the respect and support from its member states.
Although encompassing many political fields, there are no binding regulations and the
protocols are set up on a voluntary basis. The supranational bodies suffer from the
democratic legitimacy and cannot solidify their function. The organisations are therefore
de facto purely based on intergovernmental work, which is mostly based on the decisionmaking by the ministers of economic integration. The Tegucigalpa Protocol and other
treaties have arranged for a supranational component in its main organs, such as the Court
of Justice and Parliament, however in practice intergovernmentalism is still the rule
(Giupponi, 2017, pp. 245–247).
Furthermore, not all member states participate in the five main bodies which
causes inconsistencies and weakens the credibility of the SICA. The character of the
institution is still loose and non-binding and that combined with unwillingness of the
member states to integrate further means that the integration is not deepening. Central
America is still fragmented. This last problem is not an institutional problem but still
highly affecting the integration process: the different interests of the member states which
also causes a fragmentation of the cooperation process. For example, Costa Rica is not
fully participating to protect its political and economic stability by refusing to bind itself
to less developed countries. Panama has a huge financial sector and is not interested in a
partnership with the mostly agrarian SICA member states and Nicaragua claims it cannot
lower tariffs because of its precarious economic position. This clearly shows why some
scholars state the deepening of the integration is not probable. The conditions are not good
to further integrate. That is also why external incentives become more and more important
(Kurtenbach, S., 2013, pp. 49–53). Therefore, it is advisable to revise the cooperation
scheme of SICA, much like the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) was changed to
The Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) in order to maintain the process of
regionalisation (Elistania, Nurmeiga, & Permadi, 2019, p. 257).
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Despite all its institutional troubles, as we have seen, it is not only in the hand of
SICA to push integration forward. A key factor for successful integration is the good will
of the members to expand cooperation. Costa Rica has been a difficult partner to work
with, as will be shown in the next part of this paper.
Costa Rica – The Country that Hinders the Integration Process
Costa Rica has been historically reluctant to take action in the international space. Thus,
it is often called the Switzerland of Central America. Concerning the SICA, four main
choices have been identified which Costa Rica made that have hindered the integration
process of Central America as a region: (1) Not recognising the authority of the CCJ; (2)
Not taking part in the Parlacen; (3) Threatening to leave SICA and politically withdrawing
from it; and (4) Not ratifying any agreement of free movement.
In 2012, Costa Rica officially stated that the CCJ was not competent to rule, a
very similar step compared to the statement Guatemala made. This political move was a
reaction of the Costa Rican government to a CCJ ruling in a case that was filed against
Costa Rica by Nicaragua. In response to the ruling, the Costa Rican government ratified
its position of not recognising CCJ as a competent court and threatened to leave SICA, a
first hint of what has now come to pass (Redacción Perro Bravo, 2012). It is evident, that
Costa Rica has always considered abandoning SICA and has used that option as a political
instrument. Following the conflict, Parlacen members accused Costa Rica of hindering
the integration and that especially Panama was suffering from that since Costa Rica cuts
Panama geographically off. Panama, however, had also tried to leave the Parlacen but due
to legal reasons could not withdraw (Parlamento Centroamericano, 2019b).
There are claims that Costa Rica and Panama have put their commercial interests
above the regional integration process. In addition, their economies are booming in
comparison to the other Central American states. Furthermore, Costa Rica’s economic
ties are stronger to Colombia than to other countries in the area (Redacción Perro Bravo,
2012). Consequently, it can be assumed that Costa Rica does not see that the integration
delivers enough trade benefits. However, the intra-regional trade increased from $6
million (US) in 1963 to $1.8 billion at the end of the 1970s. That clearly shows that the
integration expanded the trade between the Central American countries. The problem is
that the integration process stopped in 1969 because of “deep sociological changes and
cleavages” that ended in the Football War between Honduras and El Salvador. This led
to Civil Wars in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala (Kühnhardt, 2010, pp. 82–84).
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To conclude, Costa Rica might fear that it is a possibility that Costa Rica’s stable
democratic system will be affected by the relatively young and unstable democracies.
This is further supported by the fact that Costa Rica has the highest Human Development
Index of the Central American countries (UNDP, n.d.). It is clearly further developed.
Another aspect might be the demographic characteristics of the Central American
countries due to colonisation. Costa Rica is classified in the group of countries of
European descendants, whereas most of Central America is grouped into mestizo
population countries (Kusumaningrum, 2019). This distinction might pose an
identification obstacle to the Costa Rican population.
Lastly, Costa Rica never ratified any free movement treaties so far. For instance,
the Central American free trade area that was established in 1993 included a free
movement of persons, however, Costa Rica did not ratify. Consequently, only El
Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala and Nicaragua have removed the need for their citizens
to apply for a visa (Giupponi, 2017, p. 245). This so called CA4-agreement was later also
ratified by the Dominican Republic.
A former president of the CCJ said that in order to achieve CA-8's
implementation, it was now necessary for Belize, Costa Rica and Panama to adhere. There
also have been talks about a customs union. Mauricio Diaz, member of Parlacen, expert
on international rights said that the first step into the direction of a Central American
Union is to achieve the customs union. There are many benefits to the customs union,
principally to give more potential to economic, social, and educational-cultural areas and
to achieve friendship between the neighbouring countries (Rugama, 2016). It is evident
that most Central American states want to take integration further.
Having looked at the behaviour of Costa Rica, four reasons have been found why
it would have hindered the integration, which ultimately escalated into the political
withdrawal from the SICA: (1) historical aspects (2) its strong economy and no trade
benefits (3) immigration issues and the border disputes between Nicaragua and Costa
Rica and lastly, (4) the legitimacy problem of the SICA. It has been talked about the
historical aspects of Costa Rica’s reluctant foreign policy and its strong economy.
Concerning argument (3), it is interesting that Nicaragua and Costa Rica have fought over
their border for a long time. The main issue is the border river and its fishing rights. The
next problem Costa Rica has with Nicaragua is the immense labour migration and the
mostly poor people coming over to Costa Rica. Especially here more efforts are needed
and bilateral relations between Costa Rica and Nicaragua should be improved. To get
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back at the Cuban migrant crisis, when the conflict escalated, it can be said that many
scholars suspect that Nicaragua acted on Cuba’s behalf during the Cuban migration crisis
in Costa Rica. Both countries have interacted politically in the past. On the contrary, Costa
Rica has shown close political ties to the US. Moreover, Nicaragua and Costa Rica have
been debating about border issues for decades, especially about the rights on their border
river.
To be precise, Cuba aimed at forcing President Obama to revoke the Cuban
Adjustment Act, the law that allows all Cuban nationals to get refugee status if reaching
US grounds. Nicaragua might have tried to aid Cuba in achieving this goal (Henkel,
2015). Lastly, as has been seen in the previous chapter, Costa Rica is not involved in the
Parlacen and does not accept the CCJ. The internal reasons are thus clear. Interestingly,
integration is now achieved by external pressure. For instance, the European Union is
keen on taking the integration process in Central America further (European Commission,
2003). It might be problematic since the European way of integration does not work for
all regions as good as in Europe, where the rule of law is widely accepted.
This last paragraph points out why Costa Rica could benefit participating in SICA.
An advantage for Costa Rica is that the more countries Costa Rica has on its side, the
more power they have in negotiating a deal. In this respect, Costa Rica could achieve a
higher trade benefit from working with SICA. Furthermore, by cooperating, peace
building and spreading democratic values in the younger democracies would be beneficial
to all the Central American countries. Lastly, you can change organisations from inside.
That means that Costa Rica can now enter the SICA again and can demand change, which
is exactly what Costa Rica has tried to do. Costa Rica said it would not return to the
political discussions of SICA until they do not promote reforms in the body (Parlacen
ofrece apoyo al SICA para lograr la ‘integración centroamericana, 2016).
The benefits of integration are important, and it is becoming increasingly essential
to adopt unified measures to compete in a globalised economy. SICA is the only regional
institution in which the Central American states can develop strategies for regional
security and combating organized crime. But if Costa Rica keeps hindering the integration
instead of helping to strengthen the community, it will become difficult to overcome the
problems of the region. This recognition should be an incentive for the Central American
States to resume and rescue the effort to consolidate a tribunal in which they can resolve
their differences (Redacción Perro Bravo, 2012). However, Costa Rica has been hindering
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the integration process continuously and SICA has difficulties to establish itself as a
respectable institution.

CONCLUSION
Referring to Behr and Jokela, it can be said that Costa Rica does not see the economic
benefit, nor does it want to foster a regional identity. It has always seen itself as an
exception. However, there are many political reasons for Costa Rica to rejoin the SICA.
The only problem is the institutional framework, that needs to be changed. After months
of behind the scene meetings, Costa Rica rejoined SICA after stating conditions for its
return at the end of 2016. For six months Costa Rica had not sent any delegates to SICA
bodies. Costa Rica’s Foreign minister said his goal is achieving the consensus needed to
revise and update the legal instruments. Thereby stating that SICA still needs to be
improved and that all Central American countries must work together in achieving this
(Anders, 2016). In January 2019, members of the Parlacen debated about reforming the
constitutive treaty (Parlamento Centroamericano, 2019a). The political withdrawal of
Costa Rica was used as leverage for change and improvement.
This paper focused on the question: Why did Costa Rica leave the SICA? In
conclusion it can be said that three levels of analysis have been undertaken. The first level
dealt with SICA’s institutional problems. Despite Costa Rica’s non-integrationist past,
the institutional framework of SICA is not fit for the Central American countries. The
Parlacen and the CCJ are a step too ambitious, since most of the countries are still not
ready to acknowledge a supranational entity. The second level dealt with Costa Rica’s
behavior and examined the political steps Costa Rica had chosen to take that hindered the
Central American integration. These are: (1) Not recognising the authority of the CCJ;
(2) Not taking part in the Parlacen; (3) Threatening to leave SICA and politically
withdrawing from it; and (4) Not ratifying any agreement of free movement. On the third
level of analysis, reasons have been found to explain why Costa Rica chose to dilute the
integration process. These are the four reasons: (1) historical aspects; (2) its strong
economy and no trade benefits; (3) immigration issues and the border disputes between
Nicaragua and Costa Rica; and lastly (4) the legitimacy problem of the SICA.
This research is expected to increase the repertoire of knowledge and research on
the study of regionalism and the study of the Central American region. Further research
is needed to determine whether SICA is on the way to a functioning regional organisation.
It would further widen the scope to examine the role of the other Central American
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countries regarding the integration process. In addition, it might be fruitful to the study to
include the role of the European Union and examine how norm diffusion and the transfer
of values might play a role in its endeavor to promote integration in other regions.
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2
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